UND Banner UND Banner UND Banner
  NUREMBERG TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS | Nazi Occupation of Norway  

26 Aug 47-A-FjC-23-1-Urmey (Evand)
Court V Case VII


PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: [....] Exhibit 515-A will be admitted in evidence subject to the usual limitations t[sic] at we place on evidence of this kind.

MR. RAPP: If your Honors will now please turn to page 4 of Document Book 23 and page 5 in the German Document book, your Honors, this is a deposition by Egil Sorensen to the Norwegian Police of Vadsoe describing the destruction and killing of Sorensen's wife by members of the German Wehrmacht.

DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I would ask the prosecution to tell me against whom this document is directed. I have pointed out already that the navy which is charged here and who is supposed to have committed some


26 Aug 47-A-FjC-23-2-Urmey (Evand)
Court V Case VII

act-- was not subordinate to the defendant Rendulic.

MR. RAPP: Your Honors, as to the argumentation of defense counsel, we will show later on and tie this document up that the defendant Rendulic as a matter of fact at that time commanded all German units within the German Wehrmacht in Norway in his capacity as armed forces commander Norway and commanding General 20th Mountain Army.

PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I am wondering whether this deposition is within scope of the indictment against the defendant Rendulic with regard to his conduct in Norway.

MR. RAPP: That is correct, your Honor; the area involved is in Finnmark, the Lakesfjord, and is part of the evacuation conducted by the 20th Mountain Army at that time.

PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The point I make is, he is not charged with any responsibility for killing anybody in Norway under the indictment, isn't that correct?

MR. RAPP: Your Honors, I believe the indictment states that in connection with the evacuation, several hundred people suffered death. At least 61,000 people were evacuated, or 31,000 people forcefully and, in connection with this, hardship and death was brought on the Norwegian population.

PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is the opinion of the Tribunal that the probative value is rather questionable, but rather than try to determine that now, we will permit it to go in and deal with it at the proper time.

MR. RAPP: Very well, your Honor. May I call your Honor's attention to the fact that this particular document is only submitted here as an excerpt, but we have furnished — and the original document is in Norwegian and we have only translated into German and English up to yesterday – that part which we are submitting into evidence but I have meanwhile furnished defense counsel the complete translation of this Norwegian document for his use.

PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think under those circumstances you can read what parts you want to as long as you provide the balance to the


26 Aug 47-A-FjC-23-3-Urmey (Evand)
Court V Case VII


MR. RAPP: Very well, your Honor.

"Report to: Police Chief Vadsoe submitted by Police Officer L. Naess.


"Compulsory evacuation and arson in Veidnedklubben and the killing of Frau Wilhelmine Soerensen.

"Interrogated on 2 July 1946 in Veidnedklubben: The witness Wilhelmine Soerensen. He is familiar with the incident and understands his responsibility as a witness. He is ready to make a statement and declares:

"On 16 December 1944 the witness was on the trip by motorboat to Ifjord. At that time most of the residences in Veidnes had been burned by the Germans, but the entire population had fled to the mountains and was living in adobe huts. No Germans were left in any camps in Lakesfjord, which made the population feel secure from the Germans. Arriving [v typed over i] at Ifjord the witness and the other people in the motorboat suddenly became aware of a warship lying in the Trollbukt near the shore. Dawn had just broken and the moment the people in the motorboat saw the warship, automatic weapons from there shot in front and behind the motorboat so that there was no possibility for flight.

"When the Commander of the warship hear[sic]d that the families of the people had remained in Veidnes, the destroyer went to Veidnes.

"There the German lieutenant with 14 soldiers went ashore with a Norwegian (Martin Mikelsen) who had orders to show the way to the families.

"The witness and the other people on the motorboat remained aboard and were locked into the boxes where the ropes are kept. There they remained locked up until 2100 hours when the Captain arrived and issued an order to some others to go ashore.

"The witness and two other people remained aboard in the box where the ropes are kept all night. The next day at 12:00 o'clock the witness was permitted to come out of the box and to move around the deck freely.


26 Aug 47-A-FjC-23-4-Urmey (Evand)
Court V Case VII

About half an hour later the Norwegian Julius Mattisen came aboard. The witness inquired of him concerning the witness' wife and for the first time he heard that she had been shot to death by the Germans up in the mountains the afternoon or evening before. The witness then tried to talk to the Captain. However, the latter had gone ashore. At 2:00 o'clock the same afternoon the Commander came aboard and the witness could talk to him. The Captain related that the wife of the wi[sic]tness had been killed unintentionally. Civilians some of them armed had fled at the arrival of the Germans. The Kommando [sic] had opened fire from the ship and thus the wife of the witness had been hit. The Captain further related that the wife of the witness had been buried in a lake in the country. The witness then wanted to go in order to get the body he was not permitted to do so and now the Captain said she had been buried in the ocean."


26 August-A-FL-24-1-Maloy (Int. Evand)
Court No. V, Case VII

The name of the wife of the witness was Wilhelmine, nee Eriksen. Her body has not been found.

. . . . . . . . . .

After the Germans had burned down all the remaining houses in Veidnes the destro[o typed over y]y[y typed over o]er left for Hommingsvaag in the evening of 17 December.

. . . . . . . . . .

Adult males above 50 years of age were sent as prisoners to the prison camp of Kroekeberg. Later they were interrogated by uniformed Germans. Having been detained from 11 to 12 days, all prisoners from Veidnes were released from the camp together with some other prisoners.

Read to and agreed to: signed Egil Soerensen.

. . . . . . . . . .

This particular document, Your Honor, I have just read will be marked Prosecution Exhibit 512. I forgot to mention that to the Tribunal.

Then next, Your Honor, turn to page 61, if you please, Norway XI. It was marked for identification 520-A, and is being offered as Prosecution Exhibit 520, It is on page 61 and page 56 of the German defense counsel document book. On pages 56 and 57 of the German defense counsel document book.

This, your Honor, is a medical report by Dr. Karl Evang of the Norwegian Ministry of Social welfare, and was requested by Lt. Colonel Ivar Follestad, Norwegian Attorney General's Office. It describes the destruction of Norwegian Medical Installations during retreat. There is also, attached to this particular instrument, a copy of a broadcast of BBC. This particular document I am referring to now we are not pressing for evidence at all. In other words, we are merely offering the medical report of Dr,[sic] Karl Evang. This is a letter dated June I8, 1947 addressed to Col. Follestad, and it states: —

DR. FRITSCH: I am sorry, I just want to see whether I have this letter.


26 August-A-FL-24-2-Maloy (Int. Evand)
Court No. V, Case VII

DR. RAPP: Your Honor, defense counsel was objecting to the fact that I was reading that part of the letter which dealt with a BBC broadcast, and I have just mentioned, the fact we are not offering this, but the last part of this particular letter, Your Honor, ties up the following page of the document. So in order not to create any further confusion I will read now only the last paragraph of this letter, I have already identified the date of the letter and to whom it is addressed.

. . . . .The details I have been able to gather are based therefore on accounts from individuals or from individual officials. The material is of very little use for statistical purposes, I can however, give the following information on the medical institutions that were destroyed by the Germans in North Troms and Finnmark.

. . . . . . . . . .

Then if Your Honor will turn to page 62, page 58 of the German Defense Counsel Book, the information is furnished as follows:

. . . . .North Troms:

Skjervoey nursing home, destroyed during the evacuation – 12 beds.

Malselv tuberculosis home. Used by the German air–force and afterwards destroyed – 14 beds.

Lyngen tuberculosis home. Badly damaged during the evacuation – 18 beds. Finnmark:

The following institutions were razed to the ground: Hospital at Kirkenes 23 beds, nursing home 4 beds.

. . . . . . . . . .

I hope your Honor will permit me to dispense with some of the Norwegian names, I am just trying to identify the lines some way.

. . . . . Vadsoe 45 beds, and another hospital at Vadsoe 30 beds, Vadoe hospital 54 beds, and another at Vadoe 13 beds.


26 August-A-FL-24-3-Maloy (Int. Evand)
Court No. V, Case VII

.....Nursing home, Tana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 beds

Gamv [v typed over w] ik Red Cross nursing home . . . . . . . . . . . 7 "

Mehamn nursing home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 "

Red Cross hospital, Kjoellefjord . . . . . . . . 8 "

" " " Berlevag . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 "

Kjelvik Tuberculosis home. Hon, vag . . . . . 38 "

Red Cross Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 "

Hammerfest hospital, Hammerfest . . . . . . . . . 94 "

St. Vincent Hospital, Hammerfest . . . . . . . . . 20 "

Hammerfest Mental Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 "

Home, Alta. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 "

Karasjok tuverculosis[sic] home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 "

Another one . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 "

Tuberculosis home with annex for children 83 "

. . . . . . . . . .

And at the end,

With regard to the medical institutions in Finnmark, these were all totally destroyed when the Germans withdrew with one exception – Viz. – a small tuberculosis home in Nesseby, Varangerfjorden. With the exception of the Vadsoe, so and so in hospital in Vadsoe, there was total destruction of all hospitals.

There are a number of examples that the evacuation was carried out with great brutality and several tragedies were enacted. These were partly due to sick and old being taken from their beds and with a minimum amount of clothing, being forced to board small vessels which were used during the evacuation. Several desperate situations also occurred amongst those who fled from the evacuation and hid in the mountains. Many of these had no opportunity to take sufficient clothing with them. Some were expectant mothers and there were even cases of births


26 August-A-RL-24-4-Maloy (Int. Evand)
Court No. V, Case VII

taking place in Finnmarksvidda under the lost primitive conditions in bitter cold, without clothing and with very little food.

This seems to be the only place in which a complete scorched earth policy was carried out under arctic conditions and in winter time.

(Signature) Karl Evang.

The next document, Your Honor, is page 71, page 68 of the German Document Book. It has been marked for identification as Exhibit 521-A, and it is being offered now and submitted as Prosecution Exhibit 521. This is a letter from the statistical Office of Finnmark, addressed to the Supreme Court Attorney Ivar Follstad, Victoria Terrasse 7, in Oslo, dated February 25, 1947 and his subject: "War damages in the Finnmark and North Troms. It states as follows:

. . . . . In answer to your letter of 18 inst. Town Council begs to state as follows:

In connection with the claims of reparation by Norway on Germany the Town Council has collected information on the war damages. Those informations are, however, not complete concerning the distribution of the damages on the different districts, but on the basis of the material produced, the Town Council has been able to put up the following survey on the damages especially as regard Finmark and North-Trome. The informations are partly based on approximate calculations and do pretend to be complete.

. . . . . . . . . .

DR. FRITSCH: I object to the submission of this document as evidence. This is information which cannot be checked at all. It is imp-ossible for the defense to bring the Town Council from Oslo here and crossexamine them. The Statements are not identified. It is merely an indictment, and therefore I would like that the objection be sustained


26 Auguat [sic]-A-FL-24-5-Maloy (Int. Evand) Court No. V, Case VII

JUDGE CARTER: It will be admitted for whatever the Tribunal may find it to be worth.

. . . . . Regarding the most important items special information on the damages during the evacuation in the winter 1944/45 has not been obtained. Most of the damages are included in the war damage insurance for buildings and movables amounting to about 270 million Norway Krons, for all the years of war. By contacting the War Damage Insurance you will probably get special informations about the damages due to the evacuation. The informations on the damages on public harbour works as well as on the fishing fleet are complete. The Town Council has no special information about the part falling within the time of evacuation.

Roads and bridges.

The road director has estimated the German destructions of roads and bridges in the Finmark [sic] during the evacuation in the autumn 1944 to approximately altogether 24.7 million Norw. Kr. of this about 11 million Norw. Kr. for roads and 13.7 " " " bridges.

Other war damages on roads and bridges in the Finnmark have not been taken up especially.

Telegraph and telephone.

The telegraph director has estimated the damage on stations (inclusive radio stations) and on telegraph and telephone wires during the German evacuation of the Finnmark and North Troms in the Autumn 1944 to about 15.6 million Norw. Kr.

. . . . . . .

JUDGE CARTER: It appears the time for adjournment has arrived. We will adjourn until 9:30 tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon at 4:30 p.m. an adjournment was taken)


27 August-47-M-SW-1-1-Love
Court 5 Case 7

Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg [sic], Germany, on 27 August 1947 0930-1630, Justice Wennerstrum, presiding.

THE MARSHAL: Persons in the court room will please find their seats.

The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.

THE PRESIDENT: The Marshal will ascertain if all defendants are in the court room.

THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor all defendants are present in the court room except Weichs who is absent due to high blood pressure.

THE PRESIDENT: If a certificate has been issued by the prison doctor you may hand it to the Secretary–General. You may proceed Mr. Rapp.

MR. RAPP: Your Honors please turn to Document Book XXIII, page 73, page 69 of the German Document Book. We have reached the part of this page, "Telegraph and Telephones" in the middle of the page and we now come to: "Harbors and Harbor works.

The port director has estimated the war damages on official bridges in the FINNMARK and NORTH–TROMS DISTRICTS during the German evacuation in the autumn 1944 to approximately . . . .2.2. million Norw. kr.

"In addition to this there are considerable damages on private bridges and quais. The amounts for these damages are included in the figures mentioned below by the War Damage Insurance for buildings (risks on industry and civil risk).

"The Agriculture.


27 August 47-M-SW-1-2-Love
Court V Case 7

"The War Damage Insurance from buildings has estimated the war damages on houses and buildings in agriculture in the FINMARK and NORTH TROMS districts to about . . . . 12 mill. kr.

"The War Damage Insurance for movables has estimated the war damages on machines and farming outfits domestic animals, crop and furniture to about . . . . . . . .6 million kr." That is on page 74, your Honor.

"These figures are purely agriculture risks. All damages on the property belonging to the fishing population have been entered under civil risk below.

"The damages to the forests of the Finnmark and the North–Troms districts during the war, inclusive the devastation made by the Germans during the evacuation in the autumn 1944 and inclusive future losses due to exploitation of the forests, have been estimated by the Town Council to approximate . . . . . .25 mill. kr.

The Industry.

The war damages on industrial buildings in the FINNMARK and

NORTH–TROMS districts have been estimated by the War Damage

Insurance to about . . . . . .38 mill. kr.

"The War damages on industrial movables in the FINMARK AND NORTH–TROMS districts have been estimated by the War Damage Insurance for movables to about . . . . . . . .5 mill. k4 [sic].

Houses and buildings, Movables, Civil Risks.

"The War Damage Insurance for buildings has estimated the war damages on buildings in the FINNMARK AND NORTH–TROMS (exclusive buildings has estimated the agriculture and industry and those belonging to the state) to about 114 mill. kr.

The War Damage Insurance for movables has estimated the war damages on general movables in the FINNMARK and NORTH-TROMS districts (farming and industrial movables excluded)


27 August 47-M-SW-l-3-Love
Court V Case VII

to about . . . . .94 mill. kr.


"The War Damage Insurance for stocks estimated in September 1945 the evacuation damages in the FINNMARK in the autumn 1944 to about . . . .18.4 mill kr.

The actual amounts are now considered 2–3 million Norw. kr. too high, but if all war damages on stock in the FINNMARK for April 1940– May 1945 are taken into consideration, the amount can be accounted for. The war damages outside the evacuation damages only amounted to about 2–3 mill kr.

Goods on board ships.

"The State Goods War Insurance estimates the war damaged on goods onboard ships in the FINNMARK during the evacuation in the autumn 1944 to about . . . . . . .1.2 mill. kr.

"Various war damages covered by private insurance companies are not to be obtained in detail on FINNMARK. The amount of these damages is, however, not estimated to be very high, considering the total amount of damages claimed by all insurance companies together for reparation war damages to be about 16 million Norw. kr. for the whole of the country and for all the years of war.

Ships, freighters, larger and smaller fishing boats as well as all sorts of small vessels.

"All smaller vessels at a value under 250 kr. were included in the War Damage Insurance as movables and amounts for wreckages and war damages on such boats in the FINNMARK ARE INCLUDED IN the amount of 94 million kr. under the item for movables above.

"By the State War Damage Insurance the amount of 1.9 million Norw. kr. was mentioned as the sum that this institution has paid especially for war wrecked boats, but also for partial war damages


27 August 47-M-SW-1-4-Love
Court 5 Case 7

during the war on boats having their basis in the FINNMARK and NORTH–TROMS districts.

"The re-insurance institute for the fishing fleet, BERGEN states that the amount of reparation costs paid by it for totally war–wrecked fishing boats, etc. and for partial war damages on such boats having their basis in the FINNMARK and NORTH–TROMS districts for all the years of war amounted to a total of approximately 2 million Norw. Kr. Perhaps the re–insurance institution is now able to give more exact information and especially also for the damages during the evacuation.

"In addition to the two amounts mentioned here of about 1.9 million Norw. kr. and about 2 million Norw. kr. are amounts paid by the private insurance companies for their insurance responsibility on war damages on fishingboats [sic] and other boats. As mentioned above no information has been obtained about this last amount.

"When these above mentioned amounts are added [sic], the lump sum is about 360 million Norw. kr. for the war damages mentioned under the individual items. It is to be mentioned that these damages cover direct war or direct destruction through war actions. Damages brought about in connection with requisitions of houses and grounds as well materials with special reference to the exceptional wear and tear following the German use for houses and buildings, roads and bridges etc. and material requisitioned is not included in this amount.

"The amounts mentioned in most of the above are based on the information presented to the Town Council during the war and immediately after this and they are calculated according to the prices before 9 April, 1940,

At present further additional amounts might have arisen by which the final figures would have been still higher.


27 August 47-M-SW-1-5-Love
Court V Case VII

"As a comparison it can be mentioned, that the informations received by the Town, Council up till November 1945 represent the war damages for the whole country including the total losses of ships preliminarily calculated to more than 3 billion Norwegian kroner.


Signature: A. Skien."

For your Honors' information and merely as a gratuitous comment, the Kroner is now about five kroner to the dollar, at present.

On Page 80, this particular document dontinues and there we have a letter dated 3 July 1947, signature: A. Roll-Mathiessen, Presented In Oslo Town Court. 3 July 1947:

"Central Bureau of Statistics

the Director

OSLO, 26 June 1947

Dronningens Gate 16

Telegram Adress [sic]:




Your Ref. AS/NH

File No. 849/47

Supreme Court Attorney Mr. IVOR FOLIESTAD

Strandgaten 19


Criminal case against General RENDULIC — concerning the ravages in the FINNMARK 1944/45.

We are in receipt of your query of 20 ult, regarding information on the value of the real estate in the FINNMARK and NORTH–TROMS before 9 April 1940. For this reason, the town council has had a conference with the authorities who supplied the information


27 August 47-M-SW-l-6-Love
Court V Case VII

about the ravages before, and who have made a number of calculations of the total values before April 1940 for the different groups of property in the FINMARK and NORTH–TROMS.

The calculations are as exact as they possibly could be at the present time, and the evaluation of land and ground has been kept apart as you mentioned in your letter.

Subsequently the evaluation of property together with the estimation of damages have been put up and a percentage of damage within the various groups. The amount of damages according to 'the letter from the town council of 25 February this year, has in some cases been corrected according to more recent and complete informations.

Buildings, furniture [r typed over m] and movables etc.


Court V Case VII
27 Aug 47 M-2-1-GG-Love

As mentioned in letter of 25 February most of the damages in the

in the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH–TROMS districts are under the war damage insurance for buildings and movables amounting to about 270 million Norw. cr[sic]. This preliminary figure has now been corrected by the company to about 290 million Norw.er[sic]. The total capital on buildings — furniture and movables in these provinces in April 1940 can be stated to approximately 350 million Norw. c[c tyeped over e]r. This amount comprises all houses, buildings, fire insured and not fire insured (inclusive municipal buildings but excluding the buildings of the State, which have been entered under various items below. Furthermore, it comprises all furniture and movables, machines (immovable and movable), tools and implements, crops and professional movables for agriculture (inclusive domestic animals), private bridges and quais, all small boats with a value below 250 Norw. cr. [sic] etc. The percentage of damage for the group makes about 83.

Roads and bridges

The total value on April 1940 of all roads and bridges which are part of the constructions of the road service as well as workshops, tools and stocks has been calculated by the Road Board to about 80 million Norw. cr. [sic] The damages of roads and bridges during the evacuattion [sic] in the autumn 1944 which was formerly calculated to about 24.7 million Norw. cr. [sic] has now been supplemented by 5-10 million Norw. cr. [sic] for workshops, outfits and stocks (which had been extended considerably during the war and which was almost completely damaged) to a total amount of about 33 million Norw.cr. [sic] or approximately 40% of the total value. For the bridges damage was complete.

Telegraph and telephone.

The damage on stations (inclusive radio stations and air bases) and telegraph and telephone wires during the evacuation was formerly estimated to about 15.6 million Norw.cr. [sic] This preliminary amount has been corrected to about 20 million Norw. cr. [sic] The damage is reckoned to be total.


Court V Case VII
27 Aug 47 M-2-2-GG-Love

Harbours and Harbour works.

The part director has formerly estimated the war damage on public buildings (bridges belonging to the State, the port service and the local port services) in the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH–TROMS during the evacuation to approximately 2.2 millionen [sic] Norw. cr. [sic] as a supplement was made for buildings and storehouses etc. belonging to the port service, which was not included before. The damage is considered to be total.

Ships, freighters smaller and larger fishing boats.

The town counsil [sic] has calculated the boat property in the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH–TROMS in Aril 1940 to approximately 16.5 million Norw. cr. [sic] (about 15 million Norw. cr. [sic] for some larger boats originating from HAMMERFEST, VARDO and VADSO.) [sic]

The total amount of damage for warwrecked and wardamaged fishing boats in the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH-TROMS during the whole of the war has been estimated by the war insurance company for the fishing fleet to 2.9 million Norw. cr. [sic] If the value of the larger boats which practically all have been wrecked, is added to this amount the total damage for this group is approximately 4.5 million Norw. cr. [sic] or 27.5 of the total amount of 16.5 million Norw. cr. [sic] In the letter of the town council dated 25 February of this year, the damages on this item are provisionally calculated to about 4 million Norw. cr. [sic]

Stores of goods and goods on board ships.

The town council has formerly given the damages under those items to about 19.5 million Norw. cr. [sic] The damage was total.

Various war damages covered by private insurance companies.

These are not able–as mentioned before–to give any information for the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH–TROMS provinces alone. However, the amount for such damages will certainly not be very large, as mentioned before.

The forests

The damages on the forests of the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH–TROMS during the war, including the devastation made by the Germans during the evacuation in the autumn 1944 and inclusive future losses due to the


Court V Case VII
27 Aug 47-M-2-3-GG-Love

exploiting of the forests, was formerly given by the town council as approximately 25 million Norw. cr. [sic] The assets of the forests in April 1940 are calculated to about 40 million Norw. cr. [sic] which results in a percentage of damage of about 60%. The reason for the percentage of damages being so high is evidently, as mentioned before, the fact that in the estimate of the damages the future losses on account of exploitation of the forests is included.

In addition to the amounts mentioned above concerning the buildings of the State as well as material etc. there are some amounts relating to the power staotions [sic] of the State, the State's schools, personages, post offices etc. inclusive furniture, material and outfits of transportation. The evaluation of those buildings etc. on April 1940 is calculated to about 5 million Norw. kr. and the damages during the war and the evacuation to approximately 4.5 million Norw. kr.

If all the amounts referring to the individual items above, are added together, the total evaluation of the property of the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH–TROMS on April 1940 is about 530 million Norw. kr. (exclusively the value of land and ground) and a total damage of approximately 400 million Norw. kr. i.e. an average percentage of damages of about 75%

signature: ARNE SKAUG

signature: A. Skoien

Rubber stamp: Oslo Town Court.

Dronningens Gate 16,

telephone OSLO, 3 July, 1947
Statistik [sic]
Your reference

Our reference HM/SF


Supreme Court Attorney Mr. IVAR FOLLESTAD Strandgaten 19,


Criminal case against the General Rendulic – concerning the ravages in the FINNMARK and NORTH–TROMS 1944/45.


Court V Case VII
27 Aug 47 M-2-4-GG-Love

According to letter from the Norw. Govt. statistical office of 25 February and 26 June this year, some of the items of war damages for the FINNMARK and NORTH–TROMS districts are covering all damages during the war, and consequently also the damages before the evacuation 1944/45.

To–day the Town Council has, however, obtained the following additional information about the part of damages that is to be attributed to the time before the evacuation and during the evacuation

Building, furniture and movables, etc.

In the letter by the Town Council of 26 June, the damages have been put down with a total amount of about 290 million Norwegian kr. Of this amount approximatively 50 million Norw. kr. cover the time before the evacuation and 240 million Norw. kr. approximately the evacuation period. The percentage for damages on buildings, furniture and movables, etc. during the evacuation then amounts to 70 ships, freighters, larger and smaller fishing boats.

The Town Council has no information at present about the part of the amount of damage of 4.5 million Norw. kr. falling within the time of war before the evacuation. Still the damages before the evacuation were of very little importance.

The forest.

The main part of the damages on the forests in the FINNMARK and NORTH–TROMS districts, estimated to approximately 25 million kr. falls into the time of evacuation. The damages before the time of evacuation can only be estimated to 2–3 million Norw. Kr. Considering that the estimate of damages for the time of evacuation of approximately 23.5 million Norw. kr., the percentage obtained is about 56%.

Supplement to the buildings belonging to the State as well as material, etc.

The damages included in the amount of 4.5 million Norw. kr. Are only concerning the tine of evacuation.

According to the additional information given above the total


Court V Case VII
27 Aug 47 M-2-5-GG-Love

estimation of the damages for the FINNMARK and NORTH–TROMS for the time of evacuation is about 400 million Norw. kr. minus about 52.5 million Norw. kr. 347.5 million Norw. kr. or an average percentage of about 63% of the total real capital on April 1940 of about 530 million

Norw. kr.

Signature: A. SKIEN

If your Honors now please turn to page 17 of the document book, page 19 of the German document book. This document was offered for identification only as 516A. It is now being submitted as Prosecution

Exhibit 516.

I would like to call to your Honors attention that we have only translated excerpts of this letter from the City Engineer of Hammcrfest, but we have furnished defense counsel with a complete translation of such a letter.

The City Engineer of Hammerfest

The devastation of Hammerfest after the compulsory evacuation of the population at the beginning of the month of November 1944.


On Sunday 29 October it was proclaimed that "the population of Finmark [sic] was to be compulsorily evacuated immediately". The first district of Hammerfest to be evacuated was Fuglenes–Storelven at the latest Holiday, 30 October, 1200 hours.

On Monday 30 October I called on the then Island Commandant liar or Gaedke–who simultaneously was Evacuation Commissar–in order to find out what was to happen to the public utilities i.e., fire department, water works, electricity works etc., I was together with the Administrator of telegraphy who wished to receive similar information concerning telephone and telegraph. We were told that there was no further use for the fire department. However, the water and the electricity works were to continue until further orders. I asked whether I myself should remain in the city and was told that of course


Court V Case VII
27 Aug 47 M-2-6-GG-Love

I did not have to evacuate. Then I stated the necessary number of employees I required i.e. three engineers, one guard for the den of the electricity work and preferably three men for the water work. However, the families of these people had to be evacuated because women and children were not permitted to remain.

The fire department was given leave of absence. Some of them had left already–they had been evacuated to the country previously with their families-as had other inhabitants of the city.


Court V Case VII
37 Aug 47 3-1-M-GW^Maloy

"After the evacuation of the population was finished on 3 November it became possible in the course of the following week to collect, pack up and to send away all essential remaining fire department and air protection material with the help of the persons who had remained. This material was collected from different places. All of it was went away with two freighters which had stayed there with evacuees and loaded diverse goods.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

"On 15 November when the General Horwegian [sic] Telegraph service was supposed to be liquidated or terminated and the machines were to be dismantled I telegraphed as a matter of orderly procedure to the Norges Brandkasse (Norwegian Fire Insurance). I told them that the fire department had ceased to exist on 1 November and that according to rumors the city was to be destroyed entirely. . . . . . . . .

"The devastation of the city

The figures in parenthesis in the following refer to the enclosed map of Hammerfest 1:4000. This map shows the different areas or buildings.

"As early as on the 5 and 6 November 3 farms in Fuglenesdalen and all smaller buildings in the neighborhood of the city were burned down and at the same time also the houses in Soeroyesund–the area along the Akkerfjordweg to Sjaaholmen. –The building containing the reduction valves of the water works seemingly was mistaken for an ordinary dwelling. It was burned down so that the valves were partly destroyed packing wore standing open. After the inspection the Evacuation Commissar


Court V Case VII
27 Aug 47 3-2-M-GW-Maloy

was informed that the mains of the water works would freeze if a heavy frost should occur which would put the works out of commission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

"(2) On 22 November the first part of the city, the western part (Hauen) –about 50 plots–were burned down. One or two buildings were blasted in order to prevent the fire from spreading to other buildings.  At the corner of the cemetery in the street toward the Krutthusstrasse a few small bombs and some burning wood had been dropped.  German soldiers were successful in removing all this with the exception of one bomb which exploded and blasted a piece of tho cemetery wall,–The burning down had started in the morning.  About 9:00 o'clock I arrived at a place whore the German soldiers brought out hose from a fire station to extinguish the fires.  They wanted to prevent the fire from spreading across the street toward the elementary school. However, the keys for the hydrants, the connection for the hose etcetera were missing,  I then had to help to organize the extinguishing and were now able to keep the fire from spreading. - 

"During the following days all foundations of the burned down places were blasted.  There were still 10 buildings standing unharmed, west across the Akkerfjerdweg. They remained until the last. . . . . . . . . .

"(5) On 16 December the settlement on Hammeren near Fuglenesweg–(Mella) a total of 5 buildings was burned down.  One house (Lockkos) down the road remained whole.


Court V Case VII
27 Aug 47 3-3-M-GW-Meloy

"(6) On the 24 December (Christmas Eve) the houses near the old shooting area near Stervannet, a single house in Breillia (Roy Pedersens) and a few little barracks, the building on Einan and the Ilslageret were burned down (for nothing).

"(6a) On 27 December the remaining houses in Breilia and the nursery, the Villa Nissens and the rest of the barracks around there were burned down.  On the same day probably also the buildings below the power plant were burned down. On 28 December the large Naval barracks on Skansen Fuglenes were burned.

"On one of the first days of 1945 the buildings west of Stottabakken on Fuglenes (5–6 houses) were burned down.

"(7) On 12 January 1945 the buildings east of Storelven were burned down i.e. the entire Mella and Mellaplataa including the buildings on the spur of Storelven from Storvannot.  However, not the factory of Hauan with its storage plant where cement was kept.

"(8) On 13 January 1945 all of Fuglenes, so to speak was burned down excepting the steam operated factory of Feddersen & Nissen and the landing stages there and the two western buildings up above including three houses in Fuglenesbugten.  Still remaining are the buildings of the coal depot of Robertson and the hospitals with the apartments for the physicians and janitors. 

"(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

"(10) The following were burned on 20 January: the remaining parts of eastern city district between Storelven and Material– and Stenkuls Kleminningen building on Battor iebakken up to and including the corner building


Court V Case VII
27 Aug 47 3-4-M-GW-Maloy

number 474 with the three houses in the back below the new sub-stations.

"(11) On the following days the main building of Robertson and the packing houses in Fuglenes and the landing stages and buildings were demolished.  These belonged to the Finmark Canning Factory.

 "(12) After the houses on the southwest side of Storvannet had been evacuated (the Prohibited area) which had been requisitioned by the Naval Commandant they wore all burned down and a newly erected bunker building with tremendous iron concrete walls and iron concrete roof (broadcasting station etcetera) was blasted.

"In connection with the burning down of the city all poles of the electrical power lines were sawed down, the insulators were broken and the wires were rolled up and sent away. Transformers and the equipment of the transformer stations also were dismantled and sent away with German ships.  As early as 19 November 1944 the dismantling of unitII of the power station was started after the old direct–currency generator for 1890 had been taken away. Generator III with the switch table and switches and the regulator of the turbine later was sent away by a German ship. Further dismantling was unsuccessful.

"On 4 December the destruction of the high voltage power line Porsa–Hammerfest was started.  They left the poles a good meter above the surface. The insulators were broken and the copper wires were cut, tolled up and taken away.  Usually it was cut off at each pole so that the wire has only old metal value. I do not know what happened to the transformer poles later.

"On 6 February 1945 I received orders to leave the city,


Court V - Case VII
27 Aug 47-M-3-5-EHM-Maloy

together with all Norwegians and the German units and the Russian prisoners.  Only a small detachment of engineers (blasting detachment), consisting of about 20 men and one lieutenant, and the evacuation authorities and a Norwegian tugboat with two Norwegian engineers on board remained. I received information from them concerning the fate of the rest of the city which was confirmed by the Germans mentioned above whom I met in Tromsee.

"(13) When we were in Haaja, fire was discovered in the district of the elementary school.  Its reflection was visible to the neighborhoof of LoppA. All the remaining buildings in the center district of the city from Krutthusgaten to the steamer landing stage were burning all night, also all churches. A fresh southern wind prevailed. The German port captain related that ‘unfortunately' fire had broken out in the Soldiers Home on Sadel Street (No. 353, together with No. 49, where the blasting detachment lived).  It had been hoped that the church would remain but the tower started to burn and the church also was lost.  On the following days the installation of the bunker depot was burned down and the crane tracks were blasted as well as the salt silo. But the demolitions didnot work out as successfully as they were planned.  The hospitals with the two apartments also were blasted and everything was levelled to the ground.  The other buildings of Fuglenes and in the western part of the city and by the way some other houses - all of wood - were burned down.  The refrigeration plant and the administrative building of FFR - both of them of iron concrete - were blasted.

"The steamboat landing stage also was blasted but later the tug had great difficulty to break up the supporting pillars and here the blasting did not seem to have the intended effect either.

"The bridges across Storelven and Svartelven were blasted.  The crews were prohibited from going ashore because mines had been laid. I wish to add in this connection that two German members of the Organization Todt (engineer Beer and one soldier) lost their lives on 24 January in one of the many shelters of the civilian air raid protection


Court V - Case VII 
27 Aug 47-M-3-6-EHM-Maloy

(near Svartelven) where tread mines had been laid also.  It seems that in the main street as well as in all side streets which were open for automobile traffic such mines were laid until the end.

"The power station with the remaining machines and transformers was blasted on 5 February at 10:00 o'clock after the plant had stopped functioning at 9:00 o'clock.  It was alleged that afterwards the dam was blasted and the pipe lines probably were blasted in some spots. All transformer stations were blasted after the electrical apparatus and the transformers had been dismantled and removed.  The high voltage cables in the stations were cut above the floor but they are believed to have remained undamaged otherwise excepting near two blasted bridges.

"It is assumed that of the water work units the intermediate dam ....and the installations of the reduction valves had been blasted - in any case bombs had been brought there. Also a nine inch main line in the tubular bridge across Storelven where depth bombs had been laid. It seems that the line to Fuglenes was destroyed by the blasting of the bridge across Svartelv and/or of the road near this bridge.  The jetty on the city side and the jetties on Fuglenes are undamaged.

"As stated above, after each burning the foundations, the smoke stacks, etc. were systematically blasted and levelled to the ground. It seems that the part of the city which was burned down after the sixth represents an exception.  There the blasting was started.  It stopped when the Germans suddenly left the city on 10 February 1945. Some smoke stacks, etc. were left standing near the Oscars-Plass, elementary school.  It is possible that the Zentralkommandoplatz (iron concrete on the first floor) also has been forgotten.  It was covered by snow on 6 Feburary.  On 10 February 1945 only the chapel in the cemetary remained standing.

"Temporarily Oslo, 20 April 45, signed Kummeneje (City Engineer)."

The next page attached to it was:

"To the Population.

"It has been decreed that the compulsory evacuation of the popula-


Court V - Case VII 
27 Aug 47-M-3-7-EHM-Maloy

tion of Finmark will be carried out immediately.

"In Hammerfast this compulsory evacuation is to be carried out in the following manner.

"The section Fuglenes-Storelven is to be evacuated by 12 noon Monday 30 October. People who do not go without delay to the Evacuation Office in the City Hall, 2nd floor (tax office) in order to be assigned transportation will be picked up by the" — there is an asterisk — "Police and the Wehrmacht.

"The Evacuation Authorities.

"*) Changed later to ‘den vepnede makt' (Armed Forces, Wehrmacht)"


27 Aug 47-4-l-M-AEH-Maloy (Evand)

JUDGE BURKE: Mr. Rapp, without indicating that the document you have just read will have any ovidentiary value or will be accepted as having any probative value, I am wondering about the ambiguity in the translation of the second paragraph you have just read.

MR. RAPP: Your Honor is referring to "In Hammerfest this compulsory evacuation is to be carried but in the following manner."

JUDGE BURKE:  Yes.  The apparent difference in being able to translate the language as to whether they were evacuated by the police or Wehrmacht, or by the Armed Forces, Wehrmacht.

MR. RAPP:  Your Honor, I hove been advised that the insert was put in there for the benefit of the Norwegian population to whom this particular proclamation was addressed, and it in both instances means the same.  In other words, the word "den vopnodo makt" is the translation into Norwegian of the German word "Wehrmacht", and that has been put in parenthesis.  I believe that is what you are referring to in the above paragraph.  If Your Honors permit me I would like to show you the original, how it actually looked and was corrected.

"The time for compulsory evacuation of the next part of the city will be published by proclamation.

The Evacuation authorities.

") Changed later to "don vopnode makt" (Armed Forces, Wehrmacht."

If Your Honor will turn now, please, to page 26, page 28 of the German Document Book, Norwegian Doc. VI has been marked for identification as Exhibit 523-A.


27 Aug 47-4-2-M-AEH-Maloy (Evand)

We are submitting it now as Prosecution Exhibit 523.

DR. FRITSCH:  Your Honor, I would like to ask the Prosecution who Prouthun should be, whether the Prosecution asserts this is a subordinate of the defendant Rendulic?

MR. RAPP: Your Honor, the individual Preuthun was an evacuation commissionor appointeed by the then Norwegian Minister President Quisling.  The sole purpose of this document is to show that these facts as contained in the document and reported within their own then Quisling, Government did happen during the evacuation. Minister .-hist is minister of the Government at that time, and Prouthun was evacuation commissioner of some liasson position to the 20th Mountain Army.

DR. FRITSCH:  I protest against the introduction of this document as evidence, because I don't think that this evidence is relevant.  It has nothing to do with the defendant Rendulic.

MR. RAPP:  Your Honor, this is an allegation on the part of defense counsel which we cannot concede.  I think it has very much to do with the defendant Rendulic, because it shoves what actually happened during the evacuation, and it was found in the Quisling files of the Norwegian-German puppet government at that time, and we feel it has strong probative value, because it shows what occurred during the evacuation and the date is fixed at the time, so that the defendant Rendulic was in charge of the evacuation.

THE PRESIDENT: In the light of our previous rulings it will be admitted, however, the Tribunal by that admission is not indicating what, if any, probative


27 Aug 47-4-3-M-AEH-Maloy (Evand)

value it will later give to this document,

MR. RAPP:  It is dated, Hammerfest, 3.11.44, 1655 hours,

To Minister W HIST

For information concerning situation stop SCHONER "Fortuna" 50 tons loaded from Losbosby with 250 persons including Old Age Home and 10 persons confined to bed half frozen to death on dock stop Seventeen hours to here stop Transport must be continued in the same manner stop The people received warning two hours before, and were ordered not to take along food or bedding since according to original German plan the men were to walk from Bellefjord to Hammerfest stop


MR. RAPP:  Now, Your Honor, the last document in this Document Book 23, you will find on page 33, It is page 36 of the German Document Book.  This was marked for identification as Exhibit 518-A, and it is now submitted as Prosecution Exhibit 518.  These are the charges of the Norwegian War Crimes Commission before the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London pertaining to the evacuation of the Province of Finmark, Norway.

DR. FRITSCH:  Your Honor, I protest against the introduction of this document. This document has already been mentioned, and I reserved my protest, because this is, as I have already said, surely an indictment.  The probative value, therefore, can only be as great as if the prosecutive authorities here made some kind of an assertion.  Any kind of probative value cannot be gained from such an indictment.

MR. RAPP:  The defense counsel told us the same


27 Aug 47-4-4-M-AEH-Maloy(Evand)

story yesterday, and I understand, the Tribunal told us at that time it will be admitted for what it is worth.

MR. FRITSCH:  Your Honor, a ruling was not made. Yesterday I merely protested against the form of this document, and I was told that a certification by Col. Follestad would bo submitted, and therefore I reserved my further attitude.

MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I believe we mentioned yesterday this report was an official Norwegian Government report.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Rapp, did I understand your statement that this was an indictment, it was a part of some proceedings in England?

MR. RAPP: No, Your Honor, I mentioned that this is a report in the nature of an indictment, or rather in the nature of charges. That is the accepted way of the United War Crimes Commission.  In other words, these Government reports can only be accepted by the United Nations in the form of those charged. They are not being submitted to the United Nations War Crimes Commission merely in presenting the evidence as it appears without the charges, and as such it was forwarded to us, and we picked it up as an official Government report made up in the form of charges.

THE PRESIDENT:  The Tribunal is of the opinion it has no probative value as far as this defendant Rondulic is concerned, and the objection will be sustained and it will not bo admitted in evidence.

MR. RAPP: Then Your Honor we would like to have this document remain with the identification 518-A; is that acceptable to the Tribunal?


27  Aug  47-4-5-M-AEH-Maloy   (Evand)

THE PRESIDENT:  It   is   allright with us.

MR. RAPP:  Mr. Fenstermacher will continue with Document Book 24.

MR. FENSTERMACHER:  May it please the Tribunal, before beginning with the presentation of the documents in Document Book 24.  I would like to hand to Dr. Laternser a copy of a memo which I received yesterday from the Yugoslav delegation attached to the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes.  The memo is addressed to me from Lt. Col. Svonimir Ostric, Chief of the Yugoslav Delegation, It is dated Nurnberg, 26 August 1947.

"In connection with your inquity this delegation is informed by the Yugoslav National War Crimes Commission in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, as follows:

1.  "General Bader, Paul, is registered by the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London as a war criminal.  He is not in Yugoslav custody, and the Yugoslav National War Crimes Commission does not know his present whereabouts

2.  "General Dandkolmann, Paul, was delivered to Yugoslavia by the British Occupation Authorities in Germany and is now in Yugoslav custody in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

3.  "General Fohn, Gustav, and General Schmidt Ritzberg are registered by the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London, as war criminals.  They are not in Yugoslav custody and the Yugoslav National War Crimes Commission does not know their present whereabouts.

4.  "Col. Zollmeyer, Joseph is at present in Yugoslav custody, in Belgrade Yugoslavia."



30 October 47-A-BM-22-3-Stone (Schaeffer) 
Court V - Case VII


DR. FRITSCH:  [....] I would now like, with the permission of the Tribunal, to turn to the problems of Norway.  I have, for purposes of identification, fixed a map on the wall here, a map of Norway.  It is unfortunate that I cannot submit a better map, but I think that, on the whole, we don't need that map, and when we do, it will be sufficient.

Q General, how did your assignment in the Nordic area come about? I think, to begin with, you were sent to Northern Finland. How did that come about?

A In the Spring of 1944 the Finns had entered into negotiations with the Russians, and these negotiations did not lead to any results. In June of the year 1944 a Russian offensive had started.  This had taken place on the Southern Finnish frontier along Lake Ladoga and the Finnish border.  This offensive-had a number of successes in the beginning. The moral in Finland had so far been quite a depressed one, and it was to be expected that the Finns would enter into new negotiations with the Russians.  In this situation General Dietl had an airplane accident. Up till then he had been the Commander in Chief of the XXth Mountain in Lappland.  General Dietl was a personality who was much


30 October 47-A-BM-22-4-Stone (Schaeffer) Court V - Case VII

esteemed in Finland. I believe all this took place on the 23rd of June. During the night, or the 24th of June, I received the order to report on the 24th of June at the Fuehrer's Headauarters.  On that day I was given the post of the Commander in Chief over the XXth Mountain Army in Lappland.

Q What was the relation between Germany and Finland at that time?

A Germany and Finland waged a common war against Russia. The German Mountain Army and the Finnish Army fought side by side on the Finnish border.  In spite of this there was no pact or alliance between those two countries.  The two countries only acted out of a common interest against the common enemy on the basis of military agreements.

Q What was the military situation generally when you arrived in Finland?

A On a front of about 1200 Km East of the Finnish Eastern border there was the XXth Mountain Army from the Arctic sea towards the middle of Finland, and then came the Finnish Army.  There was no common leadership.  The Finnish Army was led by the Marshal of Finland, Freiherr von Mannerheim. The front of the Mountain Army was comparatively quiet. A war of position of a normal kind was going on here.  The Army itself was stationed in two large groups, with two corps in the South of Lappland, that is the middle of Finland; and one corps was on the coast of the Arctic Sea. Between those two large groups there were no other forces.  The width and depth was 400 Km, and this area was rocky or jungle-like. For all practical purposes it was not possible to cross it.


30 October 47-A-BH-23-l-Stone (Schaeffer) Court V - Case VII

Q Was this question of terrain which you just mentioned of any special significance and importance concerning the battles and the later events?

A Yes, it was of quite decisive importance.  In the whole area of Lappland, which is the Northern part of Finland, and the area of my Army, three-quarters of the country was covered with jungles, which could not be negotiated.  The area was rocky or swampy.  Towards the North, up to the Arctic Sea, there was tundra and entirely rocky areas. This was very important considering the fact that the area could not be negotiated because there were only very few roads in this area. In Lappland there were, for all practical purposes, only three highways— the so-called Arctic Sea highway which ran from North to South through Lappland and which was about 600 Km long; and in the South of Lappland there were two highways, each of which led to one of the corps stationed there. All these highways met in Rovanjemmi, which is in Southern Lappland, a locality near the polar circle and from there two roads led to the Swedish frontier, to the so-called frontier highway which went along the Swedish frontier to Norway to the Lyrgen fjords.

Q How did the political situation in Finland develop after all that?

A At the beginning of August the Finnish Government had resigned, and the Finnish President had founded a new government.  The head of this government was Mannerheim.  This government soon entered into new negotiations with Russia. The Finns loyally informed us of this Pact. We expected that this time the negotiations with the Russians would lead to success. We expected that Finland would leave the alliance.

Q What would be the situation then confronting the XXth Mountain Army?

A The situation had necessarily to be extremely difficult if one considers the fact that from the Arctic Sea, on the Eastern coast of Finland, the front led down to the South and that in the centre of

Finland the German Mountain Army was joined by the Finnish Army, then in


30 October 47-A-BM-23-2-Stone (Schaeffer) Court V - Case VII

the event of Finland's leaving the alliance very suddenly a deep, open, uncoverered flank would arise; which was 400 Km deep.  This would be even more dangerous because the best roads from Southern Finland, led to unprotected road junction of Rovanjemmi, and to the Swedish frontier highway.  The loss of Rovanjemmi to strong Russian motorized forces and that fact that these forces might reach the Swedish frontier highway, which then led straight to Norway, had to lead to a catastrophe, for the mountain army.

Q Where any provisions prepared for these events, and, if so, which ones?

A Naturally, everything possible was prepared.  The proper forces were withdrawn and put up in preparedness.  We had to block the roads which led from Southern Finland.  We had to dynamite all bridges and mine the roads to the greatest possible extent. All this we had to do to prevent, wherever possible, the enemy breaking into the practically unprotected flank of the army.  Of course this could only be prepared in order not to provoke the Finns and also possible not to provoke the Russians. But it was prepared in the smallest detail.

Q Now, was anything known about the armistice conditions which were to be expected on the basis of the negotiations?

A No, unfortunately nothing was known about this. We did know, from the negotiations which had taken place earlier, that they had not been successful because of two conditions which the Russians had imposed. The first condition was that the Russians wanted to occupy Finland; the second condition was that the Russians demanded that the Finns were to fight against us. We tried to do everything to get clues about the terms of the armistice because that would be extremely important to know in good time. We were not successful in our attempts, and as late as the 2nd of September, the day when the Finnish Army signed the armistice conditions, I had a long talk with Mannerheim, in which, of course, we did not discuss the armistice which was already a fact. But I thought that I was right in the impression that the Finns would, this time,


SO October 47-A-BM-23-3-Stone (Schaeffer) 

Court V - Case VII

accept the condition to fight against us.

Q And how did the situation actually develop?

A On the 3rd of September the armistice between Finland and Russia was concluded. Finland broke off all relations with Germany and demanded that the German troops be withdrawn from Finland within 14 days.

Q Was this demand to withdraw the troops within 14 days feasible from a military point of view?

A That demand could not be carried out.  The demand obviously had the purpose of forcing the Finns to fight against us.  In order to evacuate Finland, the troops had to carry out marches of 800 to 1000 Km—marches on foot.  This would have meant marching unceasingly for 5 to 6 weeks.  Such an enormous effort could not be expected of the troops in such a climate and at that time of the year and in such a terrain as I have described.  The soldiers would have been able to bear up under this effort, but the horses would not have been able to do it. And the Mountain Army had very many horses because everything had to be carried out on horseback.  In addition we have to consider the fact that there were many stores which had to be carried off, and, finally, we have to consider that the troops just didn't march off like that. The enemy would prevent them from marching off and involve them in combat actions which actually did take place. The combat actions which took place, in order to get the Mountain Army out of that area, took 5 to 6 weeks, and if one is fighting one cannot, after all, march.  It was more than three months until finally the last man of the German Army had left Finland, and we tried to expedite matters as much as we possibly could, especially in consideration of the approaching winter.

Q General, you will remember that a representative of the Prosecution has stated here that this period of 14 days was better than no time at all? Would you consider that statement correct?

A Anybody who has any insight into the conditions of the roads there, the fighting situation, and what the leadership of an Army needed, would probably not make such a remark. Those 14 days to us only


30 October 47-A-BM-23-4-Stone (Schaeffer) Court V - Case VII

meant that we could evacuate to Germany the depots and the medical stores which we had in Southern Finland.  We could not do anything with these stores there because we had so much that we didn't know what to do with it all. After all, the Army had been provided for for a period of nine months.  These 14 days had no influence at all on the condition of the Army; it had even less influence because the Russians did not feel themselves bound by this time limit. They attacked already as early as the 8th of September.

Q General, will you, very briefly, indicate the next event which occurred so that we may gain a picture of the situation?

A As peculiar as this might sound, when we were concerned with a retreat we were first of all, busily engaged in building up a new front, a front with a depth of 400 Km. We succeeded in doing this in 4 to 5 days. Then, we started transporting and evacuating.  On the 7th of September the first troop movement was carried out. We succeeded in withdrawing the two Southern corps without the Russians knowing it. The Russians followed, and from that date on they attached continuously. Crises developed.  The troops had already marched off had to return in order to relieve the others. But, on the whole, our movement was successful.  The obvious purpose of the Russian attacks was to tie us and the Army down, to force us to fight, and to destroy us with their superior forces. From the point of view of military leadership the Russian actions vere entirely correct.  It was the Russian endeavor to use all available means to reach the road junction of Rovanjemmi, in order to overtake us from the rear and thus reach the highway near the Swedish frontier before we could. The battle, to prevent this Russian intention, which sometimes lasted for hours, meant to us existence or non-existence of the Army. And it succeeded.


30 October 47-A-BM-24-l-Stone (Schaeffer) Court V - Case VII

Q Did the Russian attack now remain restricted to the Southern parts of the Army?

A No, 3 weeks later an especially well prepared attack was made against the XIXth Corps on the Arctic SeA.   This was a mistake on the part of the Russian leadership, which was incomprehensible to me. It was a mistake to carry out these two attacks at different times so that it became possible for us to counter the Russian superiority by withdrawing forces from the Southern group and putting them at the disposal of the Corps near the Arctic Sea, and thus support this Corps.  These forces succeeded in relieving the XIXth Corps and getting it out of the Russian encirclement.

Q General, is this the XIX Army Corps which was east of Kirkenes?

A Yes, this was the XIX Corps which was east of Kirkenes, about 150 Km east of Kirkenes.

Q Who commanded it?

A The General of the Mountain Troops, Jodl, who appeared here as a witness for the Prosecution.

Q And now when did the first order arrive to evacuate Northern Norway?

A To the best of my recollection that must have taken place towards the latter half of September.

Q And how was this order carried out?

A We carried out this order very loosely.  The Army order at that time, was to retreat towards approximately the center of Lappland, and there to halt. We felt strong enough to defeat all attacks in this position, and we made this evacuation a voluntary one by supporting those Northern Norwegians who wanted to get away,

Q Did this situation change later on, and, if so, for what reasons?

A This situation changed later for several reasons. Principally on the 4th of October we received an order saying that we were not to remain in Lappland, but instead the Army was to be led back to a position near the Lyngen-Fjord in Norway.  That meant to us a movement of about


30 October 47-A-BM-24-2-Stone (Schaeffer) 

Court V - Case VII

800 to 1000 Km, which would necessarily last far into the Arctic winter. Then when in October the attacks against the XIXTh Corps started we were, after all, quite surprised that the Russians were in a position to emphasize their great numerical superiority, even in that barely negotiable terrain. And just around that date, a further order arrived.  The four best Mountain Divisions were to be sent to the Continent, which meant more than half of the strength of the Army. These were events which could not possibly have been anticipated, and they naturally influenced our judgment of all problems at hand0

Q General, this order,—to distinguish between concepts which you mentioned,—did the action which was to take place on the basis of the order of the 4th of September have a code name?

A This movement was called "Nordlicht".

Q You were talking about the influence which became effective through the new situation which confronted you?

A This influence was seen particularly in the fact that the Army could not deny that the second evacuation order which had come in on the 20th of October was fully justified.  Only the OK was in a position to know what would be demanded of the Army in the future and which forces would be at the disposal of the Army for those purposes.

Q If you knew, a long time before the second evacuation order arrived, the Russian strength and counted on the Russians' moving up on you, why did you then not demand this order for evacuation and destruction?

A I never waited for orders which were a matter of course, and I never asked for orders in matters which I thought I could regulate myself.  I knew quite well what I would have to do in accordance with the situation.  If I had not received this second evacuation order of the 28th of October, then I intended to concentrate the population in a tolerable area of living space.  The necessary sanitary installations were to be left for them, but everything else—the quarters which would have become available, the highways which existed, all bridges


30 October 47-A-BM-24-3-Stone (Schaeffer) 

Court V - Case VII

and harbor installations, and everything else-would have been destroyed. The necessity of these measures was never doubted for a single instant by anybody.

Q One question in between, General:  Were the Russian troops up to standard in a military respect?

A In the extreme North the Russians had to have excellent troops because the terrain and the climate were so very difficult, and because the German and the Finnish troops which confronted them were some of the best units which existed throughout this whole war. The Russians were excellent fighters, especially in rocky and forest areas. Their special units, such as the "Ski brigades," which were supplement by people from Siberia, were excellent and they gave us considerable trouble.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow morning.


at 0930, 31 OCTOBER 1947)


31 Oct 1947_M_MSD_1_1 Maloy (Schaefer)

Court V, Case VII

Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter  of  the United States of America against Wilhelm List,   et   al,   defendants, sitting at Nurenberg,   Germany,   on 31 October 1947, 0930.   Judge Burke, presiding.

THE MARSHAL:     Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.

The Honorable,   the Judges of Military Tribunal V.   Military Tribunal V is now in session.   God save the Unites States of America and this honorable Tribunal.     There will be order in the courtroom.

THE PRESIDENT:    Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the courtroom?

THE MARSHAL: May it please,   Your  honors,   all defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendant von Weichs, who is still in t he hospital.

THE PRESIDENT:    Judge Burke will preside at  this session.

JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Fritsch.



Q    General,   when we   stopped we were discussing the   question of Norway.     I had asked you yesterday to give us a picture about the strength of  the Russian forces  and you told us  they were  technically and numberically superior to your forces;  how did you imagine the Russians would follow you up?

A    There were two possibilities as to how this could be done.    First of  all  it was possible  they could push on up Highway 50, which led from Kirkenes via Tana,   then it was possible that  they would move along the highway via Voalov and finally  there was  the possibility to follow along the  so called Frontier Highway alon  the Finnish Swedish frontier.

Q    General, would you be kind enough to look at the map and show us the most important points on it?

A    One possibility would be to push up along Highway 50


31 Oct 1947_M_MSD_1_2_Maloy (Schaefer)

Court V,   Case VII

Q At this opportunity may I point  out  to  the Tribunal that  that  is

the highway which  the Tribunal saw and used when it went to Norway,   along Kirkenes   to Hammerfest.

A    Then it was possible to use the ro a to Ivals, which joined

Highway 50. T he third possibility was to push along via Rovanjemmi, along the Swedish Frontier Highway to to the Lyngen Fjord.  Those were the three possibilities on the land route.  A further possibility was to push up also by a sea operation, which we started in the area Murmans, which is roughly about here.  (indicating.)  The most suitable places for landing were the Fjords of Alta and Vorstwanger in the Southern part of Finnmark.  In to this area the roads lead from Finnland, which the Finns could have used on the land route.

Q   You are talking about landing operations, General;   did you count on the possibility of such landing operations?

A    Landing had a great deal of advantage for the enemy, because to march through those grey districts in winter time on through the whole of Finnmark is extrememly strenuous, and the Russians could have saved themselves this effort if they had carried out a pursuit operation at sea, which would have been considerable more simple.  Such an operation had to be anticipated.  The OKW also expected landings, even from the British, and they thought they would take place somewhere near Narvik, and at least half a dozen times we were told the opinion of the OKW concerning those landings.  That can be frequently found in the War Diary of the Army which arrived here from Washington.  

Q   Were the pre-requisites for such a landing good for  the Russians, such a landing as you expected would take place?

   A  Yes, we knew that in the Kola Bay there was a great number of ships, hundreds of thousands of tons which were part of the convoys which came through the Artic Sea to Murmansk about twice a month.  Those were convoys of about 50 to 60 freighters, protected by battleships, destroyers, aircraft carriers, and other auxiliary vessels.  The Kola Bay was reconnoiteved towards the end of September.  We saw a great number of ships,     


31 Oct 1947_M_MSD_1_3_Maloy (Schaefer) Court V,   Case VII

battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, etc., and these, without doubt, were British vessels, because it was wll known the Russians only had one battleship in the Artic SeA.

Q  General, if I mention to you the figure 230,000 tons of shipping, which I found in one Diary, so said to have been assembled in the Kola Bay, would that be sufficient to carry out a large landing operation?

A  Yes, 230,000 tons, can undoubtedly transport six to eight divisions, but this number of tons reported here is not the maximum of what the Russians would be in a position to use, because twice a month another convoy of 100,000 to 200,000 tons of convoy vessels arrived in the Kola Bay.  Also we learned towards the end of September or beginning of October, (I don't remember the exact date, its in the War diaries).  We learned that these convoys, which up until then had been sent by the Russians with British support, were led by the British admirally from the end of September onwards, and a landing operation would have been supported through the fact that the allies had in the extreme North undoubted supremacy on Sea and in the air, and those were the best prerequistes that they could possibly have for a landing.

Q  Were there other factors as well?

I am mainly thinking about the question of Swedish neutrality; neutrality; did you in this respect have to anticipate any difference?

A  Yes, we had to anticipate a violation of Swedish Government, moved one infantry division through Sweden to Haparanda, near the Finnish Frontier.  It could not be expected that the Swedes would resist Russian pressure if the Russians demanded the Swedes to do the same as we had demanded from them in 1941.  In that year we had, with the consent of the Swedish Government, moved one infantry division through Sweden to Haparanda, near the Finnish Frontier.  It could not be expected that the Swedes would resist Russian pressure if the Russians demanded the Swedes to let them do the same as we had demanded.  Of course, that could only been an operation of secondary importance which would have been directed against the area near


31 Oct 1947_M_MSD_1_4Maloy (Schaefer) 

Court V,   Case VII

Narvik.  The main operation was to be expected as against Southern Finnmark.

Q    In Southern Finnmark is a landing operation dependant on the season?

A   No, it is not dependent on the climate, because under the influence of the Gulf stream the fjords do not freeze up.    Also there is not very much snow in those districts in winter, but it is quite cold. It was known that the Russians as well as to the Finns were extremely wellequipped for this winter climate.


31 Oct 1947_M_MSD_2_1_Maloy (Schaefer) 

Court V, Case VII

Q  General, if I may summarize your statements, you said that the Army found itself in an extremely difficult position; did the difficult position have any effect on the morale of the troops?

A  Yes, it had a considerable effect on the morale of the troops.  Everybody was aware of the difficulty of the position.  From censorship of soldiers mail we learned that the morale of the soldiers sometimes bordered on panic.  We found letters written by soldiers in which they said that a "second Stalingrad is in preparation", "the Army is doomed", "When we freeze in with the Artic winter we will freeze as Russian prisoners".

Q  Did the Russian propaganda and if so to what extent, make use of this situation?

A The Russian propaganda made very clever use of this situation.  Above all they tried to make the men distrust their leaders.  Very soon after Finnland left the allies by radio as well as by leaflets they spread the news that the Commander in Chief of the Mountain Army was an Austrian and he wanted this Army to fall into the hands of the Russians but this fact was discovered and his withdrawal and dismissal was to be expected.  In connection with the events of 20 July 1944 and the consequences of this event, which had only happened a short time before, this propaganda found fertile soil.  There was a very dangerous crisis amongst the soldiers especially with regard to confidence in their leaders which could have led to a catastrophe if the Army or parts of it came into difficult situations.  In order to counteract the effects of the Russian propaganda, Hilter, on the 17 September, decorated me with the Golden Cross of Honor, and thus the effect of the propaganda was counteracted immediately.

Q  General, when were you convinced that the Russians would not push up on the land route via Northern Finnmark?

A  I cannot tell you exactly when I became convinced of that fact.  I assume it was towards the latter part of November.

Q  Well, what was it you ascertained at that time?

A  It had become known that the Russians had only followed us


31 Oct 1947_M_MSD_2_2_Maloy (Schaeffer)
Court V, Case VII

up past the Krkenes with weak forces.  At first however, we had to assume that he wanted to wait and gain time in order to allow things to settle down and to consolidate his forces, after many weeks of hard fighting, which had cost him many losses, and as one is apt to do as a rule when one prepares a new operation.

Q Was it possible to reconnoiter the Russian positions so that you could be informed about them?

A During the decisive period of time as of the middle of November, for practical purposes it was no longer possible to reconnoiter.  The airbases had all been transferred to Norway.  The nearest one was in Butevos, which is about 1,000 kilometers distant from the Murmansk railway.  Around that time daylight lasted only a very few hours each day.  The Artic night had already extended over the majority of the 24 hours.  Wherefore, in such a great distance for a flight and with the very short period of daylight, it was not possible to reconnoiter the movements along the Murmask railway thoroughly.

Q General, would you be kind enough to show us on this occasion the distances on the map?

A Butevos is here.  (indicating)  I would like to point out at this point, Your Honor, that in Butevos we had in the meantime mad an interim landing.  That would have been the distance of the approae for reconnoitering the movements along the Murmansk railway.  

Q Therefore, you would have had to fly over Sweden and Finnland [sic] and would have had to fly around this area?

A We would have had to fly over the whole of Finnland. [sic]

Q When was it certain to you that Russia had withdrawn forces from our former Lappland Front?

A The first news concerning this fact was received towards the beginning of December.  It was a communication from the Army Group North which was stationed near the East Prussian Frontier, and it had been confronted by a division which up to that time had confronted my front in Lappland.  We did not receive any further news concerning any other


31 Oct 1947_M_MSD_2_2_Maloy (Schaeffer)
Court V, Case VII

forces.  My front in Lappland faced about 30 Russian divisions, and the Finnish Front faced the same number.  These forces would have in any case been far too strong in the very restricted area in Finnmark  The withdrawal of forces from the Lappland area could not give us any information concerning the real intents of the Russians in Finnmark.  How many forces the Russians actually did withdraw never became known to us, and I do not know it to this day.

Q And for what reason did you after that period continue the evacuation and the destruction?

A The evacuation had, at that date, been actually carried out for all practical purposes.  The report concerning the evacuation is dated the 25 November.  Therefore, it can be assumed that around that date it had been concluded.  The destruction which was carried out also in the Southern area of Finnmark had to be continued, because moving up on Highway 50 was not the only possibility which was open o the Russians.  The even more likely operations as of November would have been a landing in Southern Finnmark.   

Q Why were the destructions which you  carried out not restricted to the villages along Highway 50?

A At first sight one might suppose that marching troops would only need localities along the march route for quarters, but that is not the case.  Even in the districts which are densely populated there were and are many villages, like for instance, in the center of Russia.   The villages along the march route were never sufficient for the accommodating of the marching troops.


31 Oct 47-M-BJ-3-1-Primeau-(Schaeffer)
Court No. V, Case VII.

Instead these troops had to use also those places which were a good distance away from the march route, and they had to take into account the great strain of the march, when it was necessary to quarter them in houses, et cetera, and that would have undoubtedly been necessary at that time in Finnmark because of the climate.  If the weather is good those extra marches can be saved by spending the night in tents right on the road.

DR. FRITSOH: May it pleast [sic] the Tribunal, I would like to submit a photostat of this map for information purposes because it is rather difficult to see the map.

Q. General, how about inhabited location along the coast and along the fjords?

A. The inhabited localities along the coast and along the fjords were of the same significance.  One has to consider the fact that Highway 50 led partly immediately along the coast and partly was very near the coast.  It further has to be considered that an army does not only march; it also has to live, especially when it is supposed to prepare an attack.  Then the army is apt to spread over the whole country.  Not only the troops have to accommodated but there are also many installations to be taken care of such as work shops, hospitals, depots, installations for supply; and for all these installations everything that was there concerning houses, et cetera, was necessary to accommodate all these operations and that was the military significance of the apparantly [sic] far distant inhabited localities.  

Q. Did that also apply for the fishing villages which were way up in Norway?

A. Yes, the same fact applied to them.  As a rule, they could only be reached by the cutters or boats.  These were the most important means of transportation in the district. 


31 Oct 47-M-BJ-3-2-Primeau-(Schaeffer)
Court No. V, Case VII.

We also had out bases in the fjords in those isolated localities and we maintained communication with them by boats.

Q. I would not like to talk about the one specific place and that is Hammerfest.  Will you please tell us the significance of Hammerfest?

A.   We worked through all the possibilities which the enemy had concerning landings.  On that occasion we again and again were confronted with the fact that Hammerfest would be the best point for supply for troops which had already landed.  It would be a good starting point and woud be a good place for distribution for the more detailed supplies to other landing points in the fjords.  Further, Hammerfesst was situated in the vicinity of Highway 50.  In order to get there all one had to do was to cross the narrow Kvaenangen Fjord and then one had an excellent road.  The place itself could accommodate a strong regiment or even a division if necessary.  This double significance of Hammerfest was a fact for an enemy in pursuit.  You must not think that we destroyed wantonly or senselessly.  Everything we did was dictated by the needs of the enemy.  That was its necessity. 

Q. And what was your attitude now toward the evacuation order?

A. I was fully aware of the facts of this evacuation order on the population that I also knew that the execution of the evacuation would mean a considerable burden to the army.  In spite of this I had to obey the order.  Concerning the necessity of carrying out destructions, my opinions coincided with the opinions of the OKW.  It was a matter of course to me and everybody else that the destructions had to be barried out.  My opinion deviated from Hitler's opinion in


31 Oct 47-M-BJ-3-3-Primeau-(Schaeffer)
Court No. V, Case VII.

the beginning only in the one factor.  I did not think it was absolutely necessary to transfer the population to other areas but I could not close my eyes to Hitler's reasons of military necessity.  I could deny that they were justified.  Jodl warned me too.  He said this time I had better follow the evacuation order since Hitler insisted under all circumstances that this order be carried out.  Furthermore, I knew -- and this is also contained in the OKW order -- that the most decisive factor in this whole affair was the Reich Commissar in Norway.  It was well know that he, this man, was very angry because the first evacuation order had not been carried out and bow he would closely supervise all activities of the Army.  It was therefore quite impossible not to obey this evacuation order. Finally, I had to tell myself that it would possibly be better for the population to be transferred to other areas rather than to spend the hard winter in the destroyed country.  I participated in bother winter battles in Russia.   Therefore, I know what flight from cold means.  I had to realize that the Russians, if the pushed up on us and if the confronted the choice of either saving themselves by using what remained in the way of shelter of sparing the population, it was certain that they would not spare the population.  Therefore, in the final analysis it was the best thing for the population that they were removed.

Q.   You were talking about the Reich Commissar for Norway.  Will you give the name of this man, please?

A.   His name was Terboven.

Q.   That is the same Terboven whom you have already named?

A.   Yes, he is.


31 Oct 47-M-BJ-3-4-Primeau-(Schaeffer)
Court No. V, Case VII.

Q. General, what were the measures you ordered for the evacuation?

A.   I have to say something else first.  The operation which had to be carried out by the army was possibly the most difficult land operation of the whole war.  During those days I said to my Chief of Staff: "If sometime after this war you have to train general staff officers, then you will have to make this operation a basis of the training because it's impossible to think of anything more difficult."  The army was spread over an area of 500 kilometers.  That is, it was spread over a wiser area than, for instance, the Allied forces in France and these forces were more than a million men strong.  The problem was to relieve this army out of an encirclement from three sides and that, in battle with a superior enemy.  Then this army would have to be concentrated on two highways and, finally, it would have to march along only one highway.  All that would have to be done on foot and in the Arctic winter.   That meant an enormous task for my staff, a more difficult task cannot be imagined.  I could not burden ir further with the extensive work concerning the evacuation.  Therefore, I formed a special staff for this operation -- that is, the evacuation.

Q.   General, can you indicate to us on this map the area over which the Army was spread?

A.   No, I am afraid I can't.  The whole eastern part is missing.

Q.   You said the eastern part of that area is not contained on the map?

A.   Yes, that is what I said.

Q.   Did the evacuation staff receive definite directives?

A.   It received certain instructions mainly with respect to cooperation with other agencies of the Wehrmacht


31 Oct 47-M-BJ-3-5-Primeau-(Schaeffer)
Court No. V, Case VII.

and with the Norwegian government.  I am afraid I don't know any details, that was the work of my Chief of Staff.  All I know is that I emphasized particularly that the evacuation had to be carried out with all the consideration for the population.  Around that time I had learned unofficially for some time that after the army had went back to Norway I was to take over the post of Commander-in-Chief ocer [sic] Norway and immediately after the evacuation order I received the official order for this transfer.  I attached the greatest importance to good relations between myself and the Norwegian population.  For this reason alone I insisted that the evacuation whould [sic] not give any cause for misgivings amongst the population.  You may also rest assured that if any kind of excuses became known to me, any unnecessary harshness or any inconsideration, I would have taken counter-measures immediately.  I was not a man who would let himself be prevented from carrying out his intentions by some action of a subordinate agency.


31 October 47-M-ATD-4-1-Primeau (Int. Schaeffer)
Court 5, Case 7

Q,  General, I will now have Document Book XXII shown to you.  Would you like to turn up page 1 in your book there which is also page 1 of the English text?  This is Document NOKW-1776.  It is Exhibit 500.  This is an excerpt from the OKW order to return to Norway for good.  Up to this date the army had been under instructions to remain in Northern Lapland.  This excerpt contains the order for the destruction of all installations which might be of use to the enemy.  Would you please look at the third paragraph?  There is it ordered that the able bodied population of Norway is to be taken along and to be put at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner for Labor Assignment.  I want to know from you whether this part of the order and the part of the next paragraph - that is, the carrying along of Finnish hostages - were these parts of the order carried out?

A. No.

Q. Would you continue, please?

A.   The handing over of the able bodiespopulation [sic] to the Reich Commissioner for labor never actually took place.  That was an order issued from the "green table' which wasgiven [sic] without knowledge of the situation, and where carrying along of Finnish hostages is concerned I can only tell you that we laughed about this part of the order.  That was completely out of the question.

Q. Would you now in this same document book look at the following document which is Exhibit 501.  This is document NOKW-114.  It can be found pn page 3 of the German and page 4 of the English document book.  This is an order by the army addressed to the 19th Mountain Army Corps.  What was the purpose of this order and why was it necessary?

A.   The order ordered the destructions in the so-called Potsame territory, this is the eastern area in Northern Lapland.  This area had to be coded by the Finns to Russia in 1944.  Today this are is Russian territory.  The order further states that reconnaissance has to be carried out concerning destructions in Norway.  These measures were a 


31 October 47-M-ATD-4-2-Primeau (Int. Schaeffer)
Court 5, Case 7

matter of course, they did not have to be ordered.

Q.   Now, General, would you like to have a look at the following document which is Exhibit 502.  You fin it on page 4 of the German document book and on page 6 of the English text.  This is Document NOKW-097.  Here the Army makes certain applications and requests to the OKW.  Can you tell us why this was done?

A. On the 4thof October, the Army received the order to retreat to Norway.  This task required quite a number of preparatory measures as, for instance, the subordination of those troops in Finnmark which up to that date had been subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief for Norway.  Further, there was another factor which I would like to point particularly.  An agreement was to be reached between the army and Navy High Command for Norway.  The Army did not ask for subordination but merely an instruction concerning cooperation and there was never any kind of subordination.  We cannot assume that the OKW would do more than the Army asked them to do.  Besides, in paragraph 4 we find the request to issue instructions concerning the destruction of the nickel works, Kelloskioki.  These instructions had to be given because after all these works were not under the army but under the armaments ministry. Finally, in paragraph 5 there is a request to the effect that the Quartermaster General of the 20thMountain Army by appointed Evacuation Commissar.  I would like to point this out because the English word "evacuation" does mean evacuation, but had nothing to do with what we meant in that particular instance when we talked about the evacuation of the population.  This evacuation was not concerned with human beings, but only with the property of the armed forces.  Around this date, the 5thof October, there was no such thing as the evacuation order existed.  

Q.   Would you now look at the next exhibit which is 503?  You find it on page 6 of the German and page 8 of theEnglish [sic] document book.  This is document -- I beg your pardon-- I withdraw this remark.  It is -- I


31 October 47-M-ATD-4-3-Primear (Int. Schaeffer) 
Court 5, Case 7

have a correction in my book concerning the document number.  I shall mention the corrected document, No. 754-PS.  This document, General, is the Fuehrer order for the evacuation of population dated 28th of October.  You told us quite a number of things about the principles for this evacuation.  Now I would like you to give us once again your comments on this order, and I want to particularly stress the question of the difference between this order and the one previously given.


31 October 47-M-ATD-5-1-Stone (Int. Schaeffer)
Court 5, Case 7

A.   In this order it is stated that Finnmark be evacuated and installations there be destroyed.  It can be seen from this order that the Reich Commissar was the man mainly respnsible for this order.  The military necessities are emphasized, the necessity for the evacuation, as well as the destruction.  There is one sentence which I would like to draw to your attention.  It is the last sentence in the second paragraph, and it reads: "Compassion for the civilian population is uncalled for."  This sentence should not be regarded as an invitation to take harsh measures.  It is to be understood in connection with the next sentence, which is the first sentence of the next passage, where it says, "The troops carrying out this order must be made to understand that within a few months the Norwegians will be thankful for having been save from Bolshevism etc., and that the whole operation is in the interest of the Norwegians."  It had to be expected that the people would be kind and would comply with the requests of individual Norwegians to exempt them from evacuation, and that these men would not know that thus they would face a deathly danger.  There is one think which I can add here, and that it that there was an oral explanation of this order to the effect that Hitler attached particular importance to the measures ordered for Finnmark because he counted on the Exile Government's landing and settling in Finnmark, if this area was left completely intact.  At this occasion I received the warning from Jodl which I have previously mentioned.  The warning was to the effect that this time I had better carry out the evacuation, and it was pointed out to me that the Reich Commissar played an important part in this affair.

Q.   In order to clarify this complex, which was this evacuation order?  Was it the first or the second order?

A.   This was the second evacuation order.

Q.   Now, on this page o of your Document Book and on page 10 of the English Document Book XXII, you find a document under Exhibit No. 504.  This is document No. NOKW-086.  This is the order issued by the Mountain


31 October 47-M-ATD-5-2-Stone (Int. Schaeffer)
Court 5, Case 7

Army for the evacuation.  Would you, first of all, give us your comments on the distribution list?

A.   Yes, this is my order, issued by me for the evacuation.  The distribution list shows the following: This was issued as an order to three corps.  They were the corps connected with the evacuation.  It went to the most southern corps for the information, this corps had no connection with the evacuation.  The fourth copy went for information purposes to the air Force and to the Navy.  These two agencies were not under the Army.  And it went for information to the Armed Forces Commander Norway and to the Reich Commissioner for Norway, and these two agencies were, of course, not subordinated to the Army either.  

Q.   General, would you now give us some individual comments on this order, particularly would you please answer the following question?  Is this order identical with Hitler's order?

A.   This order was composed on the basis of Hitler's order, and of course, it is in the nature of things that it contains more details that Hitler's order did.  Under passages one and two, the communication which was given in Hitler's order isreproduced [sic], and i would like to say the following in this connection: According to our regulations point one of every order had to contain the enemy position.  Point two was to reproduce the order by the superior agency as literally as possible.  In this instance there wasno [sic] enemy and, therefore, the communication contained in the original order was reproduced in passages one and two as literally as possible.  Apart from this the order contains general directives for the carrying out of the evacuation.  There are a few details here which I would like to point out as, for instance, that only people able to carry out the marches are to be put on treks.  Therefore, the order was not given in the way it might be assumed from those papers which we received from Norway, that people were herded together and were just driven down Highway 50.  But instead it gives here quite a number of welfare measures for the benefit of the population.  These were 


31 October 47-M-ATD-5-3-Stone (Ind. Schaeffer)
Court 5, Case 7

then explained in detail in the first evacuation orders of the Evacuation Staff which I signed myself.  This order is, unfortunately, not amongst these documents.  There is something I would like to point out from passage six, and that is that the ships which were used for the evacuation were property of the Reich Commissar, assit [sic] is expressed here.  There were quite a few disagreeable matters there as can be seen from the Norwegian documents, but the Army had no influence on these ships.  I would particularly like to emphasize passage seven.  This point states my intention and my wish for the evacuation to be carried out.  It says here, "I request all officessconcerned [sic] to carry out this evacuation in a sense of relief action for the Norwegian population.  Though there be necessities here and there to be severe all of us must attempt to save the Norwegians from Bolshevism and to keep them alive."  A person who orders something like this cannot desire cruelty and ruthlessness, but I am not in a position to put a general next to every lance corporal to make sure that the orders are carried out in a proper way.  

Q.   General, will you not please turn to the next exhibit - Exhibit No. 505?  This is also contained in Document Book XXII, on Page 12 of the German text and pages 14 of the English text.  This document is numbered NOKW.48.  It is a "top secret" document.  Did you have anything to do with this matter, General?

A.   This is an order by the OKW, addressed to the Supreme Commander of the Navy.  This order shows that the Commander in Chief of the Navy received this order on the 30th of November 1944.  Therefore, this order had to be dated prior to that date, that is the 30th of November.  The order contains a number of directives and instructions to the Armed Forces Commanders in Norway and Denmark, concerning the achievement of several measures with the Reich Commissars.  All I wanted to say in this connection is that this order could not have anything to do with me because I did not become Armed Forces Commander for Norway until the 18th


31 October 47-M-ATD-5-4-Stone (Int.  Schaeffer)
Court 5, Case 7

of December of that year.  I neither gained knowledge of this order, not did I carry it out in any respect.  

Q  Would you now please turn to page 14 of  your Document Book, which is Page 16 of the English Document Book?  This is Exhibit 506, and the Document is No. NOKW-090.  General, this is the evacuation report "Hormann."  We did not want to go into the details of this report because it is known to everybody, but please turn to page 5 and have a look at paragraph 4, which is contained on that page.  There is some talk here about a shelling of village of Kjoalle, which is supposed to have been carried out by the units of the Navy?  Was there a relation of the subordination of the Navy under the XXth Mountain Army?

A  No, the Navy was in no respect subordinate to the XXth Mountain Army.  This shelling of the village I cannot imagine, even on the basis of this report, could, at the best, have because known to me after the fact on the basis of this report, but I did not remember the incident conderned here.  I don't know what the report is talking about.  The Norwegian document show one incident where a Navy vessel fired on some people with machine guns, and one woman was killed on this occasion.  Maybe it is this incident that is meant here.  I don't know any details.  In any case, this naval unit was not subordinate to me.  


31 Oct.-M-JP-6-1-Stone (Int. Schaeffer)
Court V, Case VII

Q.   We will not turn to Document Book XXIII.  Do you have the Document Book there, General?  Please turn to page 13 in your Document Book, which is page 12-- one, two, in the English text.  This is Exhibit 514, which is Document Norway 4.  It is a communication to the Corps Headquarters of the XXth Mountain Army.  Would you please give us your comments on this communication?

A. A divisional commander comments here on the possibilities of the evacuation.  The letter is dated the 29th of October 1944.  It is strange that this communication has a receipt stamp of the XIXth Army Corps, dates teh 31stof December 1944.  The XIX Corps had been frequently on the move during that period, and I can only imagine that this communication, which is of no particular importance, for delayed and never actually, reached my knowledge.

Q.   In this same Document Book would you please turn to page 30, which is page 28 of the English Document Book.  This is Document Norway 8, and it has been submitted bu the Prosecution as Exhibit 517.  It is a report dated the 4th of January 1945.  Will you briefly five us your comments please?

A.   Is is a report from a dicision to the XIXth Corps.  This report did not go any further than the XIXth Corps, and, therefore, I did not gain knowledge of it.  The purpose of the report was to gather material to counteract the strong radio propaganda from abroad, directed against the so-called atrocities of the evacuation.  I can only say that I subscribe to every line of this report.  All I would like to point out particularly is page 2 of the report, which shows clearly that the town of Hammerfest was almost completely evacuated on the basis of voluntary applications.  On page 3, which is page 30 of the English text, it is pointed out that the BBC asked the Norwegian population not to comply with the evacuation order, but instead to withdraw into the valleys and there those people would have died.  In the next passage it is mentioned that one attempt had been made to find the people who had been left behind and that they were then evacuated.  There is some talk here about relief


31 Oct. -M-JP-6-2-Stone  (Int. Schaffer)
Court V, Case VII

actons for those who had remained behind.  Of course those actions were reported in the Norwegian reports, but they were distorted by hatred.  The term "relief action" for this population was used in the same manner by the Norwegian witness here, General Dahl, because he too had exhausted all his activities in such relief actions for those parts of the population which had escaped the evacuation.  There is nothing else I have to say.  

Q.   General, this brings us to Exhibit 519, which is on page 54 of your Document and on page 60 -six, zero- of the English Document book.  This is Document Norway No. 10.  It is the proclamation to the population for evacuation which has been repeatedly mentioned here.  Who drafted this proclamation?

A.   It was drafted by the Reich Commissar in Oslo.  My staff was asked by telephone for my agreement, and I was asked to sign my name on the document.  And, of course, I could not refuse this request, particularly since there is nothing illegal contained in this proclamation.  I would like to point out that the third passage of the proclamation has not been translated in the English document book and this passage reads as follows:  "The German occupation Authorities for this reason show themselves prepared to support the evacuation carried out by the Norwegian Government.  It will be supported with all means at the disposal of the German Agencies.  

Q.   Then, will you please turn to page 83 in your Document Book -- eight, three, which is 89-- eight, nine--of the English text.  This is Exhibit 522, Document Norway No. 13.  It is an Order of the Day where you make it known to the troops that you have taken over the post of the Commander in Chief of Norway.  You were charged with this order under Count 2.  Will you please give your comments on it?

A.   Will, I don't see why I am charged with it.  All I do here is to announce to the troops and to the other command authorities that I have been made Armed Forces Commander of Norway, and it is a matter of course that this be done.  In such orders, which are rather formal, it is 


31 Oct.-M-JP-6-3-Stone  (Int. Schaeffer)
Court V  Case VII

common usage to conclude then with, "Long Live the Fuehrer."  That is done in all countries. I don't see what is interesting in this.

Q.   Now, let us turn to Exhibit 512, which on page 5 of the German text and page 4 of the English text if this Document Book.  The Document is Norway No. 2.  This is a report by a police official in Vedsos.  Did you ever gain knowledge of things mentioned in this document?

A.   No, I never gained knowledge of them.  The action described here seems to be identical with the shelling by the Naval units, which we mentioned in the report "Hormann," but apart from that there is nothing I can say about this whole document.

Q.   General, in this context there is one other question which has been touched upon earlier.  What became known to you at actions during evacuation which might be objected to?

A.   Reports of the troops did not bring anything of this kind to my knowledge, and practically that could not be expected of them either.  But the British Radio, the Russian radio, the Swedish radio, and the Swedish press did bring certain incidents to my attentions.  All kinds of things were assorted in these reports, and I had every single assertion followed up.  I intended to take a large-scale countermeasure against such excesses if the really had occurred, but all these assertions turned out to be mere inventions, or else they were matters in which neither the Army not the troops had been guilty.  I would like to give an example.

THE PRESIDENT:Just a minute.  We'll take our morning recess at this time. 



31 Oct.-M-JP-8-1-Love  (Int. Evend)
Court V  Case VII

THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.

THE PRESIDENT:You may continue, Dr. Fritsch.


Q.   General, first of all we have dealt with the military documents concerning Norway and now we are dealing with some documents which I would like to describe as civilian ones.  Before the recess I asked you what you have to say about objectionable occurrences in connection with the carrying out of the evacuation and you stated that in particular you received information about these things from the foreign press but that these reports were either terribly exaggerated or else distorted.  Now I would like you to continue with describing these things.  Please, would you do so.

A.   I just wanted to quote and example of Russian propaganda.   The Russian radio reported when the Russian troops came into the neighborhood of Kirkones they found Norwegians living in cases, norwegians who ere sick and had no medications, etc. and they added that in such a condition the Germans left the Norwegians behind, but to this I could only say that people concerned were people who had resisted being evacuated and they had arrived in this condition through their own fault.  Another report was in the Swedish press.  Some Norwegians were found frozen to death in the Swedish-Norwegian frontier area.   They had insufficient clothing and had marched through the mountains and so were frozen to death.  These were clearly people who did not want to be evacuated and had resolved by themselves to find their way to Sweden and against this too the Army was powerless; and then the Swedish press brought a reportabout the fact that during the evacuation the Germans carried out such ruthless destruction that they set a house on fire in which there was old men and the name of locality was also given.  In order to get this straight I ordered an investigation under military law.  This was carried out by the XIX Corps and in all details, it was shown clearly that no house had been set on fire unless it have been previously searched in all corners, In this way the


31 Oct.-M-JP-8-2-Love  (Int. Evand)
Court V  Case VII

propaganda accusations went on, but not in one single case did I find any justified reason.  

Q.   General, please turn to page 19 of the document book XXIII, English page 17; this is document No. 516.  Excuse me, Exhibit No. 516.  This contains a report of the City Engineer of Hammerfest which has been accepted here for whatever probative value it may have.  In this connection I am only interested to know when Hammerfest was destroyed.

A.   From the report it can be seen that the destruction started at the beginning of November, and that in January and February the destruction continued.

Q.   Now with regard to the last document we are going to deal with here, this is Exhibit No. 521, German page 68, and English page 71.  It is document No. 12.  This document contains a calculation of the war damages in Finmark. Can you please comment briefly to this question.


31 October 47-M-SW-9-1- Maley (Evand)
CourtV  Case VII

A.   In order to comment on the war damages, of course, there is of course, the masis missing the basic documents.  From this report it can be assumed however, that some items contain the total war damages and then that the original damage figures were even increased in later corrections.  From these eports it can also be seen that in Norway until the preparation for this trial tarted, [sic, ‘s' to faint to see on image] nobody thought about these damages at all, and therefore these calculations bear the characteristic of great speed and superfluity, and from the date it can also be seen that these calculations were very quickly made for the purpose of this trial, and I think that these facts spear for themselves.

Q.   And now a few general questions; until when were you Commander in Chief in Norway?

A.   Until January 13, 1945.

Q.   And then where did you go?

A.   Then I had the supreme command of Army Group North during the battle in East PRussia.

Q.   And then later on you took over Army Group South, when was that?

A. Before that I had Army Group Kurland in the 6th Kurland battle, and last of all I was in charge of Army Group South.

Q.   Army Group South was in operation against whom?

A.   Army Group South was in operation against the Russians in the areas between Czechslovakia and Yugoslavia, and later on individual units fought against the Americans, who came from the rear , from the West into the back of the Army Group.  

Q.   And when did you cease hostilities?

A. I stopped fighting on the 7th of May, 0900 hours, and this was against the Americans, and then I gave the order to the four armies of the Army Group that on the evening of the 7th they should withdraw from the Russian front, and they should retreat towards the west.

Q.   And with which American General did you negotiate?

A.   I negotiated with General Walker, the Commanding General of the


31 October 47-M-SW-9-2- Maley (Evand)
Court 5  Case 7

20th American Tank Corps, deputizing for General Patton, the Commander in Chief of the 3rdAmerican Army.

Q. And then when were you made a prisoner of war?

A. On the 7th of May I gave myself up as a prisoner of war to the Americans.

Q. What are you now?

A. I am convinced that I am still a prisoner of war.  

Q.   And did you sign a statement to the effect that you were in agreement with your release from being a prisoner of war?

A. No, it wasn't like that.  I signed the release certificate at the beginning of January together with 5 or 6 other officers.  We gave the signature only under the threat of disciplinary measures if we should refuse to sign.  The signatures were given under protest.

DR. FRITSCH:Your Honors, at the moment I have no further questions on direct examination to the witness.  I have had the intention to submit at this point the documents which I still have to submit, and these documents were promised me by the Translating Division for this morning, but I just heard that they won't be ready until this evening, and therefore I would like to place the witness at the disposal of the prosecution for cross-examination.