Date: Mon, 10 Jul 1995 18:29:43 EDT From: "Randy Nichols, ACA Pres." <75542.1003@compuserve.com> CHINESE CRYPTOGRAPHY Part III HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES China appears to have had a much delayed entry into the cipher business. Partially because so many Chinese did not read or write, and partially because the language was so complex, Chinese cryptography was limited until the 19 century. But there were seeds: The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu (500 b.c.) recommended a true but small code, which limited the plaintext to 40 elements and assigned them to the first 40 characters of a poem, forming a substitution table. Richard Deacon describes a method of code encryption which the secret society Triads used in the early 1800's. (24) The Tong's in San Francisco used the same system. This method limited the plaintext space and based codewords on multiples of three. The "Inner Ring" techniques taught to Sa Bu Nim's (teachers) by the masters of Korean Tae Kwon Do (which came from the Ancient Tae Kwan and before that Kung Fu) were passed on by means of codeword transposition ciphers. (25) In 1985, Sun Yat-Sen used codes to transmit information by telegraph. (26) During WWII, Herbert Yardley taught Kuomintang soldiers to cryptanalyze Japanese ciphers. However, the Japanese had already outpaced the Chinese in cryptanalytical abilities. Japan's Chuo tokujobu (Central Bureau Of Signal Intelligence) was responsible for crypto-communication and signal intelligence, including cryptanalysis, translation, interception, and direction finding against the Soviet Union, China and Britain. It began operations in 1921. (28) In May 1928, the Angohan (Codes and Ciphers Office) obtained excellent results in intercepting and decoding Chinese codes during the Sino-Japanese clash at Tsinan between Chiang Kaishek's Northern Expeditionary Army and the IJA (Imperial Japanese Army). (29) The warlord Chang Tso-lin was murdered in June 1928. Angohan succeeded in decoding "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang's secret communications and made a substantial contribution to the understanding of the warlord politics of Manchuria. (30) The Anjohan not only mastered the basics of Chinese codes and ciphers but also broke the Nanking Government and the Chinese Legation codes in Tokyo. (31) The Chinese codes in 1935 were called "Mingma". They were basically made up of four digit numbers. The Chinese did not encode the name of either the sender or receiver, nor the date or the time of the message. The China Garrison Army's Tokujohan office was able to disclose the composition, strength, and activities of Chiang Kai-shek's branch armies, such as those led by Sung Che-yuan and Chang Hseuh-liang. It was not able to decode the Chinese Communist or Air Force messages. (32) By the time of the 1937 Sino-Japanese War, Japanese cryptanalytical experts had been able to greatly expand their knowledge of the Chinese system of codes and ciphers, as well as improve their decoding skills. About 80% of what was intercepted was decoded. This included military and diplomatic codes but not the Communist code messages. (33) Chinese Nationalists upgraded their Mingma codes in 1938. They adopted a different system, called tokushu daihon (special code book) in Japanese which complicated by mixing compound words. By October, 1940, Chiang Kai-shek's main forces were using a repeating key system. This stumped the Japanese cryptanalists for a short time, then they returned to a 75% decoding level during the war. They continued to make great contributions to major military operations in China. (34) The Japanese broke the Kuomintang codes during the Chungyuang Operation in the Southern Shansi or Chungt'iao Mountain Campaign. (35) In February 1941, significant penetration of Communist signal traffic was obtained. (36) The tokujo operations against the North China Area Army and the Chinese Communist codes was tragic failure. (37) The IJA's China experts held a highly negative image towards the Chinese. This may have prejudiced their attitude towards intelligence estimates of China and the Chinese which in turn adversely affected their operational (crypto-intelligence) thinking on China in general. (38) When the Sian mutiny broke out and Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped in December 1936, Maj. Gen Isogai (IJA's leading expert in COMINT for China) toasted (more like roasted) the demise of Chiang. Col. Kanji Ishiwara (Japan's chief military strategist) deplored the incident because he felt China was on the brink of unity because of Chiang Kai-shek's efforts. He considered the ability to read Chiang's codes just a matter of doing the business of war. (39) ============================================================ (23) David Kahn, "The Codebreakers," Signet, New York, 1973. (24) R. Deacon, "The Chinese Secret Service," Taplinger, New York, 1974. (25) Interview with Grand Master Sin Il Choi.,9th DAN, June 25, 1995. (26) IBID, R. Deacon, p144. (27) H. O. Yardley, "The Chinese Black Chamber," Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1983. (28) Yukio Nishihara, "Kantogan tai-So Sakusenshi," Vol 17., unpublished manuscript, National Institute for Defense Studies Military Archives, Tokyo.,(hereafter NIDS Archives) (29) Fumio Nakamura, Rikugun ni okeru COMINT no hoga to hatten," The Journal of National Defense, 16-1 (June 1988) pp85 - 87. (30) Sanbohonbu, ed., "Sanbohonbu kotokan shokuinhyo." NIDS Archives. (31) Yukio Yokoyama, "Tokushu joho kaisoka," unpublished handwritten manuscript. (32) Hideo Kubota, " Zai-shi dai-go kokugun tokushu joho senshi." unpublished manuscript, NIDS. (33) Ei'ichi Hirose, ",Finland ni okeru tsushin joho," in Showa gunji hiwa: Dodai kurabu koenshu, Vol 1, Dodai kurabu koenshu henshu iinkai, ed., (Toyko: Dodai keizai konwakai, 1987), pp 59-60. (34) Kubota manuscript. (35) Chungkuo Ti-erh Lishih Tangankuan, ed "K'ang-Jih chengmien chanch'ang," Chiangsu Kuchi Ch'upansheh, 1987., pp993- 1026. (36) Yokoyama manuscript. (37) Hisashi Takahashi, "Military Friction, Diplomatic Suasion in China, 1937 - 1938," The Journal of International Studies, Sophia Univ, Vol 19, July, 1987. (38) Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, "Thunder Out Of China," William Sloane Assoc., New York, 1946. (39) Shinsaku Tamura, "Myohin kosaku," San'ei Shuppansha, Toyko, 1953.